Bacterial Contamination of Platelets: A Review of the Policy Making Process by Hay, Shauna N.
ShaunaHay 
Bacterial Contamination of Platelets: A Review of the Policy Making Process 
by 
Shauna N. Hay 
July 5, 2006 
A Master's paper submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Public Health in 
the School of Public Health, Public Health Leadership Program. 
Approved by: 
l rn(;~ (~ 
Content Reader: Mark E. Brecher, MD 
Second Reader: William Williamson, MPH 
1 
ShaunaHay 
Abstract 
On March 1, 2004, the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) initiated a new 
standard that required all blood banks to have methods in place that limit and detect bacterial 
contamination in platelet components. However, the road to achieve this standard was neither 
quick nor easy. Over the last 15 years, there have been numerous governmental meetings and 
workshops devoted to the topic of platelet bacterial contamination, however, none of these ever 
produce a resolution or mandate to reduce the risk. In contrast to the mandates for most viral or 
newly emerging agents, the push for policy on the issue of bacterial contamination of platelet 
products has come from within the blood banking community. 
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Introduction: 
Assuring the safety of the blood supply is a technologically advanced process 
requiring multiple federally mandated infectious agent tests, aseptic processing, and 
stringent quality control measures. However, while the blood supply is exceptionally 
safe, transfusions are not 100% risk-free. While the threat of viral agent infection has 
declined in several years, bacterial contamination in blood products, particularly platelet 
components, has emerged as the greatest infectious threat to patients. 1 Unlike other blood 
safety issues, the blood banking community has highlighted the issue of platelet bacterial 
contamination and the impetus for policy has come from within the community as 
opposed to governmental agencies.2 
On March I, 2004, the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) initiated a 
new standard that required all blood banks to have methods in place that limit and detect 
bacterial contamination in platelet components3 Similarly, the College of American 
Pathologists (CAP) also recommended (and subsequently required) that laboratories have 
a method to identify platelet bacterial contamination4 Interestingly, to date, there has not 
been a federally mandated standard regarding bacterial detection. 
As much of the recent literature has focused on the methods to detect bacterial 
contamination, few reports regarding the policy development issues exist. This paper 
will provide a historical overview of the policy making process for bacterial 
contamination of platelet components. 
3 
Shauna Hay 
Platelet bacterial contamination- a paradigm shift: 
The majority of blood products are stored at cold temperatures (i.e., red blood 
cells l-6"C, and plasma products <-20"C), however, platelet products must be stored at 
room temperature (20-24°C) in order to maintain viability5 This unique storage 
temperature makes platelet components more vulnerable to bacterial overgrowth. In 
addition, the preservative solutions used to prevent coagulation and platelet activation in-
vitro provides a source of nutrients for bacteria as well as the platelets themselves. 
There are 2 types of platelet product available in the U.S. Random donor whole 
blood derived platelet concentrates are created from a whole-blood donation and are 
generally pooled to make a full dose of platelets for patients (5 or 6 concentrates). 
Platelets are also derived from cytapheresis procedures and are called single-donor or 
apheresis platelets. Platelets are biologic products intended for replacement therapy 
(patient deficient in number or function) when there is concern for bleeding or problems 
with coagulation. 
It is currently estimated that 1 in 1000 to 1 in 3000 platelet units are bacterially 
contaminated, however, in the majority of cases, septic reactions are unrecognized or 
overlooked in patients. 1 Most platelets are transfused to patients with severe underlying 
disease (e.g., malignancies) who are frequently receiving a multitude of medications 
including antibiotics, which may mitigate the effects of a bacterially contaminated unit. 
In addition, clinical recognition of a septic platelet event is not always detected. Patients 
exposed to virally contaminated units develop a chronic illness and can then rally for 
better standards and changes to reduce the risk for others. However, unlike the prolonged 
patient's disease course from a virally infected unit, the transfusion of a bacterially 
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contaminated unit can result in more acute symptoms and possibly lead to death in a 
matter of hours or alternatively they recover. Thus, there are few victims suffering from 
the chronic sequelae of the contaminated unit who would demand a solution. 
In contrast, to viral marker testing for agents like human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV), hepatitis viruses, and West Nile Vims (WNV), bacterial testing cannot be 
completed prior to "release" of the component to the hospital transfusion service. 
Routinely, blood products are tested for viral agents soon after collection through donor 
samples. Units that test positive for a viral agent are disposed of and not shipped to 
hospitals for transfusion to patients. However, if one were to test for bacteria at 
collection, one would invariably miss a large number of contaminated units. This is 
largely due to the small inoculum of bacteria at the time of collection, sampling "error", 
and the need to allow the bacteria time to enter growth phase in order to have a detectable 
quantity of bacteria. In addition, the platelet components themselves have to be sampled, 
as many cases of bacterial contamination are due to skin contamination, thus testing 
donors would not, in most cases, reveal contamination. 
Currently, the blood banking community has blood components in inventory that 
are "release" tested negative for viral markers. A release test is an assay that once 
completed, clears a unit for transfusion or not, whereas a quality control (QC) test does 
not always affect the decision to transfuse 6 The criteria used for approval of a release test 
are more stringent because the device must assure that the products are not contaminated 
with greater than a certain level of bacteria. 
Currently, there is no Food and Drug Administration (FDA) cleared "release" test 
for bacterial contamination. However, on day 2 of storage, platelet components need to 
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be sampled and tested by one of the FDA cleared "QC" methods. If a positive result is 
determined and that unit is still in inventory, it would be quarantined. If the unit has 
already been transfused, close monitoring of the patient would need to commence. As 
the storage life of platelets is generally 5 days, waiting for a culture sample to be 
documented as negative (as in a release test), the life span of the platelet would be over. 
In all, the testing of platelets for bacterial contamination involves a paradigm shift in the 
blood banking community as the product is on the shelves of the transfusion service 
while being tested and is transfused with a test that is often "negative to date". 
The Precautionary Principle: 
Prioritizing risks has always been a challenge for the medical system, as it is 
challenging to reduce all risk while attempting to provide the best service possible. 
Unlike, viral contamination of blood products, there is no media attention for the issue of 
bacterial contamination or a celebrity spokesperson. Bacterial contamination has not 
reached high levels of interest even though it remains a far greater threat than 
Creutzefeld-Jakob disease (CJD), mad cow disease (variant CJD), or WNV. In many 
cases, the blood banking industry has attempted to provide the public with products that 
continue to preserve the public's trust. However, this often means that there are 
standards established to lessen the fears created out of media attention7 
In 1995, Dr. Donna Shalala, as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS), commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to review the 
government's role in the HIV crisis following a request from Representative Porter Goss 
and Senators Edward Kennedy and Robert Graham8 Overall, the IOM report was 
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judgmental of public health leadership as they seemed to fail in superseding the 
conservative nature of the blood bank community. Dr Michael Stoto, Division of Health 
Promotion and Disease Prevention from the IOM, gave a summary statement before the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the United States Senate on October 30, 
1997. Dr Stoto stated that,8 " ... a failure ofleadership in the government and the blood 
industry led to several missed opportunities to help protect the public from the threat of 
AIDS. Preventing a similar outcome from a future threat, the committee concluded, will 
require mechanisms to ensure strong leadership and coordinated, systematic 
decisiomnaking." And, "Policymakers quickly developed a list of clinical and public 
health options to reduce the risk of AIDS, but because of substantial scientific uncertainty 
about their harms and benefits, they adopted the least aggressive options consistent with 
the available scientific information."(Emphasis added) As a part of the IOM report, there 
were several recommendations including Recommendation 6 that states,9 
"Where uncertainties or countervailing public health concerns preclude 
completely eliminating potential risks, the FDA should encourage, and where 
necessary require, the blood industry to implement partial solutions that have little 
risk of causing harm." 
However, the risk of bacteria remains real and has plagued the blood banking 
industry while the government has focused on other lesser threats. This is where the 
precautionary principle is necessary in the development of policies and standards. The 
European Environment Agency in 1992 stated that: 10 "In order to protect the 
environment, a precautionary approach should be widely applied, meaning that where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the enviromnent, lack of full 
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scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation." 
Further, 
"The precautionary principle permits a lower level of proof of harm to be used in policy-
making whenever the consequences of waiting for higher levels of proof may be very 
costly and/or irreversible." 
Death from a bacterial contaminated unit is irreversible. Therefore, one may 
argue that it is unethical to allow patients to die when there are devices available that 
could help to lessen, if not eliminate the problem. This is not what is to be called 
"excessive risk aversion" but using sound scientific judgment for preventive action7 
Moving towards zero-risk is not an easy task, as the closer we get, the more likely we 
have impacted availability. This is the balancing act that the blood bank industry must 
tackle. Currently, the FDA allowed shelf life of platelets is limited to 5 days due to fear 
of bacterial overgrowth over time. However, in the context of platelet bacterial detection, 
if7-day expiration of platelets were to come to fruition, the impact of the safety 
regulations would balance out the impact on availability. 
The policy making process: 
Over the last 15 years, there have been multiple meetings and workshops devoted 
to the topic of platelet bacterial contamination, however, none of these resulted in a 
resolution to reduce the risk. On May 29, 1992, the FDA and CBER held the 361h Blood 
Products Advisory Committee meeting prompted by an increase in the number of 
reported septic events from contaminated blood products. At this meeting the Committee 
discussed the possibility of even shortening the expiration date, however due to the 
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anticipated impact on inventory, which might result in a shortage of platelets; this was 
felt not to be feasible. 11 
The Division of Blood Diseases and Resources, the National Heart, Lung and 
Blood Institute (NHLBI), Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), and the 
FDA held a workshop at the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center of the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) titled Conference on the Microbial Contamination of Blood 
Components on September 27, 1995. The main goals of this conference were to review 
the info available about the causes, detection and prevention of microbial contamination 
of blood components and to provide guidance for research in these areas. 12 However, 
again there was no recommendation or resolution passed to begin limiting the problem of 
bacterial contamination. At a later conference, Dr. Jay Epstein of the FDA was quoted as 
saying in regards to this prior workshop that, 13 "It was of excellent scientific quality, but 
there was perhaps at that time an aura of disappointment because people were hopeful 
that we could get more out of it in terms of perhaps solutions to the longstanding problem 
of bacterial contamination." 
Over the next four years, many research projects delved into the problem of 
bacterial contamination, particularly of platelets. In addition, there were many reports of 
incidence data in order to gain an accurate risk assessment. The Transfusion Transmitted 
Disease (TID) Committee ofthe AABB issued a set of recommendations that were 
published June 191h, 1995.ll The TID Committee emphasized the development of 
screening assays and the development of inactivation protocols, highlighted the 
preferential use of single donor apheresis platelets instead of a pool of whole blood 
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derived platelets to reduce the risk ofbacteria (a function ofboth the nwnber of needle 
sticks and donors), and stressed arm disinfection and aseptic techniques. 13 
On September 24, 1999, the US DHHS, the FDA, and CBER sponsored another 
workshop entitled Bacterial Contamination of Platelets, with the objective to obtain 
current information on bacterial contamination of platelets, and then to also encourage 
research and development efforts to minimize the transfusion risk. 13 Even though 
bacterial contamination is a serious risk in the blood banking community, several 
speakers were disappointed with the twnout for the workshop. Dr. Mo Blajchman of 
McMaster University stated, 13 "It seems to me that if this conference had to do with 
variance CJD disease where there hasn't been a single case of transfusion transmission, 
this auditorium would be overflowing." Furthermore to set the tone of the workshop, Dr. 
Blajchman is also quoted as saying "We are contributing to the death of many people 
unnecessarily, and we're not doing very much about it." 
Many of the world experts gave presentations at this workshop in order to attempt 
to obtain a resolution or mandate on the subject. Dr Mark Brecher of the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill stated, 13 "When human health or the environment is 
threatened, precautionary measures are indicated, even if additional scientific evidence is 
needed to establish certain cause and effect relationships." Brecher is further quoted as 
saying, " ... the perfect should not be the enemy of the good, and implementation of 
partial solutions- and we may not have a perfect one- but partial solutions, and we have 
a variety of partial solutions that are currently available and many others that will be 
shortly available, that have little risk of causing harm should be encouraged." 
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However, even with partial solutions available, there was disagreement as the 
implementation of such solutions. Ed Tabor from the FDA stated,13 " ... what we're 
trying to do is identify the best new technology that can be applied to prevent a serious 
health problem, and the concept of taking the good without seeking the perfect sounds 
very nice, but I think we have to keep our eye on the scientific rationale and try to 
achieve something that meets 1990 standards of accuracy and reproducibility, and that 
will, in fact, prevent these infections." In addition, Tabor was adamant that this issue be 
addressed through established scientific data and not "anecdotal experience" as "neither 
the public nor the medical community will accept that as a basis." 
Many of the speakers and experts stressed the significance of having a mandate in 
order to secure the adoption of bacterial testing. Dr. Blajchman stated, 13 " ... what is 
required at this point is a mandate that requires something to be done for the bacterial 
sepsis problem ... " Dr Ed Snyder from Yale University stressed the importance of 
governmental buy-in by saying, 13 "FDA regulation versus hoping, which is the 
appropriate way? And I think it's regulation. Nothing says "I care" like a page of 483s 
( 483s are the citation forms left from an FDA inspection)." Snyder further urged the 
FDA to consider the role of leadership by stating" ... I believe the way this field will 
move forward is not by the good efforts of the voluntary organizations, but I think the 
FDA needs to assume a role of leadership and to gently push us into some type of 
bacterial testing, keeping all of these things going while we're developing inactivation 
technologies." 
In concluding remarks for this workshop, Dr. Jaro Vostal of the FDA continued to 
stress the importance of surveillance in order to develop accurate risk assessments. 13 
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Nevertheless, Vostal did remark that," ... some strong opinions from the audience that the 
FDA should do something now and not wait for the ultimate test or ultimate solution to 
the problem. I think having this workshop here is a first step towards doing something 
because we certain! y need to find out what the contaminating rate is and know where 
we're starting from. I think it's fortunate that we're dealing with a familiar foe, and 
that's bacteria. This is in contrast to the issue with CJD where we're not familiar with the 
pathogen." However, even with the explicit discussion of several detection schemes 
available, there was no mandate or resolution passed at this workshop. 
As a follow up to this workshop, the summary was presented at the FDA 
committee, Blood Products Advisory Committee (BP A C) meeting on March 16, 2000. 
Dr Chiang Syin stated that the FDA has taken several actions including the establishment 
of the Bacterial, Rickettsial, and Parasitic Agents staff within the Division of Emerging 
and Transfusion Transmitted Diseases by the Office of Blood Research and Review to 
develop a program for bacterial contamination research. 14 In addition, the PHS Bacterial 
Contamination Working Group (BWG) was created by Dr. Jay Epstein to address 
regulatory and scientific issues as they relate to bacterial contamination. 
On February 15,2002, the BacT/ALERT system and culture bottles (bioMerieux, 
Durham, NC) was approved by the FDA for the QC testing ofleukocyte reduced 
apheresis platelet units. 15 The 51 0K summary clearly states that this system should not be 
used in determining suitability for release, thus the system was only cleared as a QC test. 
Shortly thereafter, Medsep Corporation (a subsidiary of Pall Corp, Covina, CA) also 
received approval on August 21, 2002 for the Pall BDS system as a QC test for detection 
of bacteria in platelet components. 16 
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The FDA and CBER sponsored a third workshop on August 7-8, 2002. This 
workshop was called the "Safety and Efficacy of Methods for Reducing Pathogens in 
Cellular Blood Products used in Transfusion."17 Again this meeting was a place of much 
discussion regarding the issue, but no governmental mandate was thought to be 
forthcoming even though there was one approved system for QC (the BacT I ALERT) and 
one system nearing the approval process (Pall BDS). 
Following this workshop, several prominent members of the blood banking 
community including Drs Mark E. Brecher, Jim AuBuchon of Dartmouth-Hitchcock 
Medical Center, Roslyn Yomtovian of University Hospitals of Cleveland, Paul Ness of 
Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, and Mo Blajchman issued an "Open letter to the 
Blood Collection Community" on August 16, 2002 that called for a program to detect 
bacteria in platelet to be started immediately (written letter, August 2002, Appendix A). 
The authors noted that the focus of the prior workshop was on inactivation technologies 
and" ... it is unclear when such inactivation technologies will be available. Bacterial 
detection technology, however, is currently available and screening via bacterial culture 
has been shown to be practical and effective." 
Even though this "call to action" came from within the blood banking community, 
not all members of this community were ready to rally for this issue. For example, Dr 
Breanndan Moore of the Mayo Clinic submitted a letter to the California Blood Bank 
Society e-Network Forum that states concern for the lack of a governmental mandate, 18 
"The fundamental problem seems to be that there is as yet no agreement on what can or 
should be instituted as a routine protective measure. It is usually the case that data are 
presented to the FDA which demonstrate that a particular course of action is wise and 
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that the FDA can logically mandate that all blood collectors institute such a course 
forthwith. In this particular situation there is no FDA mandate and no real consensus on 
what steps we should initiate." Furthermore, Moore expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
open letter by claiming that, "The presence of this letter of exhortation, however well 
intended, carries no regulatory "weight" and provides no clear path of action for those 
being exhorted. Such a situation, though, I am sure, not intended as such, is tantamount 
to moral blackmail since it implies a less than caring and concerned attitude on the part of 
any blood bankers who do not "do something"." Somewhat more lightly, Dr Ronald 
Domen from the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center of Penn State University College of 
Medicine expressed his concerns on the e-forum by stating, 18 "I also share concerns that a 
plea for mandatory bacterial detection has been made without sufficient information and 
discussion." The original letter writers offered several rebuttals that included references 
on bacterial sepsis risk, the need for a consensus, and a solution to the problem. 
On January 23 and 24,2003, the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and 
Availability (Committee reports to the Secretary for the US DHHS) held its 18th meeting 
on "Prioritizing decisions in Transfusion Medicine: Transfusion Transmissible Diseases." 
Many speakers discussed risks and how the blood bank industry responds to those risks. 
Dr. Jay Epstein, from the FDA, gave a summary of a recent BPAC meeting where they 
recently voted on if they agreed with the "FDA's proposed statistical approach to 
providing quality control for platelet contamination. In this case there were zero votes in 
the affirmative ... " 19 In addition, Dr. Epstein further added, 19 "The significant comments 
from the committee discussion focused on the concern that the medical benefit of a 
statistical quality assurance approach to monitoring platelet contamination has not been 
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validated in any suitable large-scale study, and that therefore we (the FDA) were advised 
that we should be shy of promulgating such a recommendation ... " 
Even without the buy-in from the FDA nor the BPAC, the DHHS Advisory 
Committee on Blood Safety and Availability did recommend that the "Secretary take 
steps to encourage and facilitate implementation of available measure that could: a. 
reduce the risk of bacterial contamination, and b. prevent errors that can result in 
hemolytic transfusion reactions. "20 
Over the next 6 months, the AABB Blood Bank/Transfusion Service Standards 
Program Unit developed a standard that mandated testing of bacteria in all platelet 
components. The standard, approved March 3, 2003, was to be implemented by March 1, 
2004 and reads as follows: 3 
5 .1.5 .1 The blood bank or transfusion service shall have methods to limit and 
detect bacterial contamination in all platelet components. Standard 5.6.2 applies. 
5.1.5.1.1 Standard 5.1.5.1 shall be implemented by March 1, 2004. 
Standard 5.6.2, which is referenced in 5.1.5.1, reads as follows: 
5 .6.2 The venipuncture site shall be prepared so as to minimize the risk of 
bacterial contamination. Green soap shall not be used. 
Interestingly, Standard 5.1.5.1 was allotted a !-year time frame for implementation, 
whereas many Standards are generally published with a 2 to 4 month implementation 
period (written letter from Dr. Kathleen Sazama to Dr. Christina Beato, Febmary 2004, 
Appendix B). 
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Similarly, CAP and their laboratory accreditation program added a Phase I item 
(recommendation) to the Laboratory Accreditation Checklist in December 2002.4 This 
item asks the question, "Does the laboratory have a system to detect the presence of 
bacteria in platelet components?" Even though this Phase I item was seen as a 
recommendation, there was controversy that the agency was acting too quickly on the 
issue, however CAP remained determined to retain the item. 
From March 2003 to March 2004, blood centers and suppliers as well as hospital 
transfusion services developed policies and protocols to implement Standard 5.1.5.1. 
Many facilities also purchased equipment from FDA approved suppliers to perform the 
testing on all platelet components. 
Even with Standard 5.1.5.1 in place and facilities quickly ramping up to launch 
platelet bacterial testing, the controversy surrounding this issue had not faded. On 
February 24, 2004, Dr. Christina Beato, Acting Assistant Secretary for Health from the 
DHHS, wrote a letter to Dr Kathleen Sazama, President of the AABB, commending the 
AABB for its progressive action, but requesting that "the AABB carefully consider delay 
in the implementation until a clear plan is developed." Dr Beato expressed concern that 
"the implementation of this standard by the March I, 2004 may cause potentially serious 
and possibly unintended effects on the availability of platelet products for patient care." 
Dr Beato further recommended that a "round-table discussion" occur with the major 
stakeholders (written letter from Dr Christina Beato to Dr Kathleen Sazama, February 
2004, Appendix C). 
Dr Sazama replied to the DHHS concerns on February 27, 2004 in a letter 
(Appendix B) that stated, "The AABB has provided extensive guidance to its members 
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on the implementation of this standard, including processes for emergency release of 
platelets in the event of impending shortages. By this time, most, if not all, of our 
member facilities have plans to comply with the March 1, 2004 implementation date. For 
these reasons, after consideration of the issue, the AABB believes that further delaying 
the implementation of this standard will compromise both patient safety and the public 
health." Dr Sazama later stated at an Advisory Committee meeting that,6 "Given the fact 
that this standard has been proposed almost a year-and-a-halfprior to this date, and that 
the AABB had provided considerable opportunity for public comment, it came as a 
surprise to us that HHS would make this request at such an extremely late date." Even 
with an attempt to stall the standard at the eleventh hour by governmental officials, the 
AABB maintained its position and continued with the implementation. 
As a direct result of the communication between Drs Beato and Sazama, the 23'd 
meeting of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability on April 7, 2004 
had as its major topic the impact of bacterial testing on platelet components. Dr Sazama 
stated that, 6 "AABB strongly believes that the new bacterial contamination standard will 
help improve patient care and save lives. We believe that we should stop holding our 
patients hostage by allowing the perfect to be the enemy of the good. Unfortunately, in 
the absence of regulation or standard setting, and in the face oflimited reimbursement, 
there has been, and is, little incentive to invest in blood safety advances such as this. 
AABB believed it was our responsibility to act to serve our patients, even if the FDA had 
not acted yet in this regard." 
In order to handle the issues raised by bacterial contamination testing and to assist 
member organizations, the AABB established the Interorganizational Task Force on 
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Bacterial Contamination ofPlatelets.21 This Task Force was charged with several 
objectives including serving as a focal point for bacterial detection issues, providing a 
fomm for discussion between major stakeholders, interacting with test manufacturers, 
surveying hospitals/blood centers to assess the impact of regulation, and providing 
guidelines. This group surveyed hospitals and blood center in the Fall of2004 and 
determined that the majority of facilities that responded (350 of900, 38%) that there was 
little impact on platelet availability due to Standard 5.1.5.1. 
Again, on the 24'h meeting of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and 
Availability held on August 27, 2004, bacterial detection in platelet components was on 
the agenda. The FDA voiced several concerns with the newly implemented Standard 
through spokesperson, Dr. Jaro Vostel. The lack of validated methods for whole blood 
derived platelets was of particular significance. Dr Vostel stated that,22 " ... we'd like to 
see standardized methodology for automatic culture systems ... " and "We would also like 
to see application of automatic culture systems to whole blood derived platelets, and this 
would eliminate the use of non-validated methods for these products." In addition, Dr 
Vostel commented that," ... we'd like to see a validation of the automatic culture system 
for a release test claim." (A release test field trial would need to consist of a study of 
greater than 50,000 units and would cost millions of dollars.) It is interesting that the 
FDA would have so many recommendations for improving on current standards, when 
they themselves have not mandated any regulation. 
Current status: 
Currently, the AABB and CAP have mandated standards for their member 
agencies that specifically address bacterial contamination of platelets. Furthermore, there 
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is now a licensed system for culturing whole blood derived platelets, thus limiting the 2 
tiered safety approaches. Unfortunately, this approach is expensive and wastes platelet 
product. Until the FDA approves pre-pooling of whole blood derived platelets, there will 
continue to be a discemable difference in safety between apheresis and whole blood 
derived platelets. 
With the advent of bacterial detection, 7-day platelets have become a reality in 
certain markets. There are of course specific protocols and waivers that a blood 
center/transfusion service must follow, however 7-day platelets are on the market and the 
extended shelf life with culture aids in increasing the safety and availability of platelet 
products for patients. 
Conclusions: 
Policies regarding to bacterial contamination of platelet components are currently 
working to reduce the number of septic transfusion events. However, these policies are 
still mandated through voluntary accreditation agencies, not by governmental oversight. 
Interestingly, the FDA has held a number of meeting and workshops on the issue of 
bacterial contamination, thus deeming it worthy of policy, but never recommending one. 
Regulatory control in the US has generally focused on new diseases such as WNV 
which led to nationally mandated efforts to screen the blood supply with WNV nucleic 
acid testing. To place this risk into some perspective, in 2002, twenty-three transfusion-
transmitted cases ofWNV were identified in the US.23 Of these 23 recipients, 7 died, but 
only 5 of these deaths were associated with WNV meningoencephalitis. During the same 
period, 17 deaths from bacterial contamination ofb1ood products were reported to the 
FDA.24 Why has the FDA readily jumped on the theoretical risks of agents such as WNV 
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or CJD, but disregarded known risks such as bacteria? This question has yet to be 
answered, but one can speculate that there are multiple answers. Perhaps, the 
governmental regulatory bodies are dissatisfied that the "ground-swell" for this issue 
came from within voluntary agencies and was pushed through regulation by non-
governmental bodies. Perhaps, the FDA is still waiting on the "perfect" test that will 
follow "release-testing" and not be just a quality control test. Unfortunately, the HN 
crisis and the recommendations from the IOM that the FDA,9 " ... should encourage, and 
where necessary require, the blood industry to implement partial solutions that have little 
risk of causing harm" has been a lesson lost. 
While governmental agencies have not followed through with securing the safety 
of the public blood supply from bacteria, the AABB and CAP should be commended for 
their work to reduce the risk from bacteria and save patients' lives. 
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Phone 919 966-8465 Fax 919 966-5013 
Email (Internet) "BRECHER@ MED.UNC.EDU" 
August 16, 2002 
Open letter to the Blood Collection Community 
A recent FDA workshop in Bethesda, Maryland held on August 7 and 8, 2002 addressed the safety and efficacy of 
methods for reducing pathogens in cellular blood products used in transfusion. At this meeting, the consensus of 
opinion was that bacterial contamination of platelets represents the largest transfusion transmitted disease risk. 
The focus of this meeting was a discussion of inactivation strategies that targeted nucleotides as a means of achieving 
pathogen reduction. However, it is unclear when such inactivation technologies will be available. Bacterial detection 
technology, however, is cmTently available and screening via bacterial culture has been shown to be practical and 
effective. 
In the interim, given the current risk of bacterial contamination of platelets of approximately 1/1 000-l/2000 per unit, 
we call for the blood collection community to immediately initiate a program for detecting the presence of bacteria in 
units of platelets. 
Respectfully, 
~ 0-(] !\ 
\ji \ Cv-J~ \j---'1 !1\~ ~ I - 1 "'-l 
Mark E. Brecher M.D. 
Director, Transplantation and Transfusion Services 
Professor, Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine 
University of North Carolina 
Roslyn Yomtovian, !'vl.D. 
Director, Blood Bank-Transfusion Medicine Service 
Associate Professor, Department of Pathology 
University Hospitals of Cleveland 
.Vlorri::. . .-\. Blajchman. \11.0 .. F.R.C.P.(C.) 
Director, Transfusion Medciine 
Professor, Departments of Pathology and Medicine 
McMaster University 
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James AuBuchon, M.D. 
E. Elizabeth French Professor and Chair of Pathology 
and Professor of Medicine 
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center 
Paul M. Ness, M.D. 
Professor, Pathology, Medicine & Oncology 
Director, Transfusion Medicine 
Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions 
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AMERICAN 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BLOOD BANKS 
February 27,2004 
Via E-mail and Facsimile 
Dr. Cristina V. Beato, M.D. 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Health 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Hubert H. Humphrey Building, Room 716G 
200 Independence Avenue, SW 
Washington, DC 20201 
Dear Dr. Beato: 
Thank you for your letter concerning the implementation of AABB standard 5.1.5.1 requiring 
methods to limit and detect bacterial contamination in all platelet components. The AABB 
standards are voluntary and are developed through an evidence-based decision-making process. 
For the last ten years, physicians in the field of transfusion medicine have identified bacterial 
contamination as one of the most serious risks of transfusion. In the United States, bacterial 
contamination is considered the second most common cause of death overall from transfusion 
(after clerical errors) with mortality rates ranging from 1:20,000 to 1:85,000 donor exposures. 
Indeed, transfi1sion-associated bacterial sepsis represents the most common cause of death from 
infectious disease reported to the FDA, with 46 of 277 (16.6%) of all reported fatalities between 
1990 to 1998 attributed to sepsis. With approximately 4 million platelet components transfused 
annually, current estimates are that 50 to 100 platelet recipients die each year as a result of 
receiving bacterially contaminated platelet 1mits. 
Our vohmtary standard, initially published for comment on November 1, 2002, addresses this 
critical safety issue. The final and current wording of the standard was adopted and published on 
March 1, 2003. Although AABB standards are generally published with an implementation date 
of two to four months, the AABB allowed a one-year period for implementation of the 22nd 
edition, in recognition of the challenges inherent in complying with this standard, which, for 
some, have included a total transition to pheresis platelets. 
To address any concerns over potential whole blood derived platelet shortages raised by the 
standard, the AABB, at the December 12,2002 Blood Products Advisory Committee, (and again 
at the March 14, 2003 Blood Products Advisory Committee) specifically requested that the FDA 
facilitate bacterial detection of whole blood platelets by "reexamining its current thinking under 
which platelets pooled in either the blood collection facility or the transfusion facility, regardless 
of the use of sterile methods, carmot be used beyond four hours after pooling." Extension of the 
Dr. Cristina V. Beato, M.D. 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Health 
February 27, 2004 
Page 2 of2 
time frame would allow for pooling at the time of production of whole blood derived platelets 
which would in tum, provide a mechanism to do culturing. This is a technique used successfully 
in Europe. At that same meeting, the AABB urged the FDA to "act quickly to consider what data 
will be required to extend platelet storage to seven days, provided that an acceptable bacterial 
detection system is used." 
The AABB has provided extensive guidance to its members on the implementation of this 
standard, including processes for emergency release of platelets in the event of impending 
shortages. By this time, most, if not all, of our member facilities have plans to comply with the 
March 1, 2004 implementation date. For these reasons, after consideration of the issue, the 
AABB believes that further delaying the implementation of this standard will compromise both 
patient safety and the public health. 
The AABB remains committed to seeking the resolution of any regulatory and/or surveillance 
issues raised by this standard. Our leadership would be pleased to participate in a round table 
discussion with the Department of Health and Human Services on these issues. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
tr~+,k~~ 
Kathleen Sazama, MD, JD 
President 
cc: Jerry Holmberg, 
Executive Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability 
Department of Health and Human Services 
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OPHS EXEC SECRETARIAT 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND RUMAN SERVICES 
Dr. Kathleen Sazama 
President 
FEB 2 4 2004 
American Association of Blood Banks 
8101 Glenbrook Road 
Bethesda, Maryland 20814-2749 
Dear Dr. Sazama: 
l{iJ012 
Office of the Secretary 
Assistant Secretary for Health 
Office of Public Health and Science 
Washington D.C. 20201 
I commend the American Association of Blood Banks for its progressive action to impmve the 
safety of the blood supply by reducing the risk of bacterial contamination of platelet components 
through the addition of a new standard for accreditation in the 22nd edition of Standard for Blood 
Banks and Transjl.lsion Setvices. Although the intent of the standard is laudable, several issues 
have been brought to my attention that suggest implementation of this standard by the March 1, 
2004 may cause potentially serious and possibly unintended effects on the availability of platelet 
products for patient care. Given the potential public health interests involved in the addition of 
this new standard, I request the AABB carefully consider delay in the implementation until a 
clear plan is developed. 
In order to address outstanding implementation issues including approved quality control 
methods applicable to pre-release testing, potential extension of platelet daring, pooling of 
random donor platelets, and surveillance and reporting protocols for positive test results in 
patients aud donors, I recommend a round table discussion with the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) agencies, blood centers, transfusion services and manufacturers. br. 
Jerry Holmberg, my Senior Blood Advisor, is available to coordinate HaS' participation at such 
a round table discussion. Dr. Holmberg can be reached at 301-443-3234. 
I strongly support every effort to improve the safety and availability of blood products, including 
this most recent initiative on reducing bacterial contamination in platelets, and I thank you for 
your leadership at the AABB. 
Sincerely yours, 
~--v.: ~ft~lr. 
Cristina V. Beato, M.D. 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Health 
